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IAC-09.E8.3.1
TOO-CLOSE ENCOUNTERS OF THE THIRD-PARTY KIND:
WILL THE LIABILITY CONVENTION STAND THE TEST OF THE COSMOS 2251-
IRIDIUM 33 COLLISION?
Frans G. von der Dunk
University of Nebraska, College of Law, Space and Telecommunications Law Program
Fvonderdunk2@unl.edu
1. The facts of the collision
space law regime may need elabor~tion
alld refinement to deal with such
incidents in an optimal fashion.
Abstract
Cynics would say: space lawyers nlust
have been waiting for this for decades,
and now will of course iInmediately
call for additional regulation. But
indeed, the recent collision between
the Cosmos 2251 and the Iridium 33 On 10 February 2009 the Cosnlos 2251
satellite, the first time since the and Iridium 33 satellites collided at an
Cosmos 954 disintegrated over Canada altitude of some 785 kilometres 'above'
that the Liability Convention stands a Northern Siberia, presumably with a
chance of officially being invoked, relative velocity of at least several
raises a number of issues regarding the hundreds of miles per hour,
applicability of that Convention, and iInmediately transfomling at least one
tIle level of precision with whicll it can of the Iridium's mobile telephony
be applied. nodes as well as all of the Russian
The present paper undertakes a critical satellite into a debris cloud likely to
analysis of some of these issues. remain in orbit for at least decades. I
Notably, this concerns the involvement Iridium 33 was a comnlercial telecom
of a cOInmercial satellite run by a satellite owned by a US private
private .operator in the collision (the company, even if de.facto its operations
Liability Convention providing for a were sustained by the US military as an
very nluch state-oriented liability anchor custonler. Cosmos 2251 was a
regime), the issue of 'fault' as Russian military satellite also used for
detcnninative of the level of liability of telecommunications.
the two principal states involved in the Cosmos 2251 had been launched in
collision, alld the concept of 'space June 1993 from Plesetsk in Russia, by
debris' - as Cosnlos 2251 was the Russian Space Agency on top of a
apparently non-operational and out of Proton vehicle, and registered by means
control for more than thirteen years - of a note verbale with the United
and what to do with it legally, in tenns Nations in June 1994.2 The satellite,
of liability as well as otherwise. however, had become defunct and -
In view of the gradually growing presumably - completely out of control
population of alIter space with man- during 1995.3 Iridium 33 had been
made artefacts the Cosmos 2251- launched together with six other
Iridium 33 unfortunately but very Iridiunl satellites in September 1997 on
likely will not be the last too-close a Proton launch vehicle froIn
encounter of this third-party kind. And Bajkonour, the Russia-nln spaceport in
cynics or not, lawyers will have to Kazakhstan, of which Russia informed
address the extent to which the CUlTent the United Nations in March 1998.4
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2. TIle collision and the Liability
Convention
There should be - and indeed is ~ little
dOllbt that liability issues arising from
the collision would first and foremost
trigger the applicability of the 1972
-L.iability Conventions. The collision
concerns two space objects involving at
least t\VO diflerent l1ations, the United
States and the Russian Federation, and
~ as will be seen - both the question of
liability as between the two respective
operators/owners, a11d the question of
liability towards allY potential further
\lictims., be they in outer space., in air
space or on earth, are principally to be
regulated by the Liability Convention.6
Even as the Liability Convention's
application hinges on the damage being
caused by a space object, whicll in turn
is generally defined as an object
intended to be lallllched into outer
space, ill view of the altitude of the
collision there can be no doubt that it
took place in outer space making the
two satellites space objects for the
7present purpose.
Still, it should be noted that as SUCll the
applicability of other legal regilnes for
dealing with liability claims is not to be
fundatnentally excluded. The Liability
Conventioll itself already expressly
declares that its invocation would not
stand in the way of any clailTI regarding
the sanlC event being pursued "in the
courts or administrative tribunals or
agencies of a launching State'~.R
F'urthennorc, prior to triggerillg the
application of the parts of the Liability
Convention providing for a dispute
settlement procedure, the paliies to a
dispute on liability for damage caused
by a space object are supposed to find a
sol-ution through 'diplolnatic
negotiations9 - which nlay well include
tIle option of using other liability rules
or principles than those provided by the
Liability COllvention, and/or another
200
dispute settlell1cnt procedure t]lat that
provided for in tIle COllventioll.
The GIlly case \vhere., so far, the
Ljability Convention has been formally
applied, even if only explicitly referred
to in the claimant's statementl()~ the
disintegration of the Soviet Cosmos
954 satellite over Canada in 1978, inter
alia illustrates this very point. In the
final document settling the dispute it
was agreed by the Soviet Union to pay
an amount of C~$ 3~OOO,OOO ex gratitI --
and the final document itself did not
Inention the I~iabilityConvention. 11
It should be pointed out that in the
present case the Liability Convention
has not (yet) been invoked by either
party (neither has any other potentially
liability dispute settlement regill1e been
so invoked), but once it \vould be, such
invocation would ill11nediately be seen
not to lead to easy and autonlatic
solutions and results. There are (at
least) three interrelated aspects
complicating any such application.,
~lllich \vill be discussed in the
following three sections.
3. The involvement of a COilllTIercial
satellite
Firstly, a closer look at the collision and
possible application of the Liability
Convention briIlgs the issue of the
existing lack of clarity of the proper
place of private entities in the
international space law liability regin1c
back_ on the table - the operator of the
Iridium 33 satellite., of course, \vas
IridiulTI, a private US company_
The issue is 110t so lTIuch that lridillnl
itself, in case it would consider doing
so., COllld not invToke the Liability
COllvelltion. This would be Ulldisputed
as the Convention unequivocally only
allows states to assert claillls under it. 12
In this case, therefore, IridiulTI'I being a
"juridical person" of the United States,
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might try to convince the US
govenlment to assert a claim on its
behalf. 13
The problenls arise essentially on the
other side of the fence: if the Russian
Federation would feel like establishing
a claim under the Liability Convention,
could it do so against the United
States? The Liability Convention
clearly establishes "the launching
State" to be the liable entity for
damage caused by a space object for
which it qualifies as such a "launching
State", but only lists the four criteria
for qualifying as SUCll by reference to
"a State" - "A State which launches or
procures the launching of a space
object [or] A State from whose
territory or facility a space object is
launched". 14
Does that make the United States the
"launching State" of the Iridium 33
satellite? As stated, the launch of that
satellite was undertaken by the Russian
Space Agency on a Proton vehicle,
procured by Iridium itself (which is not
'the United States'), and took place
from Bajkonour, which is in
Kazakhstan. The only legal link
between the United States as a state and
Iridium as a company having procured
the launch of a satellite therefore is the
latter's US nationality but
'nationality' of an operator is not as
such referred to in the context of the
definition of the "launching State" .15
On the other hand, various scholars
have argued that the link of nationality
would somehow make the United
States the liable entity in a case like the
present one, either as the "state which
launches" (which thus is effectively
interpreted to read 'a state which itself
launches or whose entities launch') the
relevant space object, or as the 'state
procuring the launch' somehow as if by
proxy through such nationality of the
actual entity procuril1g it. While a
further argument for legally equating
201
the activities of Iridium to those of the
United States as a sovereign party to
the Liability Convention could be
derived from Article VI - which makes
a ~. relevant state internationally
responsible as much for its own
activities in outer space as for those of
non-governmental entities - also this
argument is a matter of interpretation
deviating from the literal text of the
Convention's clause.] 6
Neither does state practice help much,
as various states have detennined the
scope of their national authorisation
regimes, supposed to take care of
domestic consequences of international
liability claims being paid out of state's
treasuries, quite differently. Some states
require entities with their nationality to
obtain a license for undertaking space
activities, others focus on other criteria
for such requirements, for example
referring to the territory from which
relevant activities are conducted. 17
In the case of the United States,
notably, the Commercial Space Launch
Act (which takes care inter alia of
international liability) in its present
iteration does require a license with
attendant obligations only for those
intending "to launch a launch vehicle
or to operate a launch site ( ... ) in the
United States", as well as any "citizen
of the United States ( ... ) [wishing] to
launch a launch vehicle or to operate a
launch site (... ) outsjde the United
States" - not, for example, to SOlneone
only operating the satellite launched
and/or having ordered such launch. Is In
tum, the US Comm'unications Act,
which deals with the licensing of
satellite operators, does not require any
coverage of intenlational liability
claims under the Liability Convention
that the United States might be faced
with - and moreover applies its
licensing obligation only to those
undertaking their satellite operations
fj US . 19rom terrItory.
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Consequently, in the (so far
hypothetical) case of .Russia wishing to
pursue a liability clailTI under the
Liability Convention, this might serve
as a clinching argunlent for the United
States to deny any qualification as a
~'laullching State" with respect to
Iridium 33.
This is further reillfore-ed by the fact
that the launch of the satellite was not
registered \vith the United Nations by
the ·United States, again providing clear
evidence that the Ullited States does not
consider itself a 'launching state,20
(whereas Russia merely lnentioned it in
the note verbale, in contrast to its also
providing for proper registration of
some other spacc objects).
More problematically still, the laLlnch
[rOlTI Bajkonour Inakes both
Kazakhstan (as the state whose
territory was used for the launch) and
Russia (""hose launch facilities were so
used) into launching states for the
lridiunl 33.21 Even if the United States
would be considered a launching state,
a clainl between two launchillg states
would be thus at stake!
The Liability Conventioll, essentially
dealing wit]1 third-party liability is - to
say the least - not geared to such
scenarios. It deals \vith joint launching
state-scenarios only to the extent that
joint liability towards third parties is
concenled ~... where it provides: "A
launching State which has paid
cOlTIpensation for danlage shall have
the right to present a claim for
indemnification to other participants in
th.c joint lallnching. The participants in
a jOillt launching may concillde
agreenlents regarding the apportioning
alnong themselves of the financial
obligation in respect of which they are
jointly and severally liable.,,22 ..~
In sum: in the end the qualification of
Russia as a launclling state also of
Iridiunl 33 to use a non-US launcll
provider laullching from nOll-US
202
territory and facilities l'vould 1110ke .for
non-applicability' (~f' the Liability'
Convention to the collision at issue.
This, it should be stressed, was tl1e
consequence of the choice of the
private US cOll1pany cOllcemed
without further (fannal) interference
by th.c US authorities23 - leading to the
SOl11cwhat ironic result that Russia, as
successor to a Soviet Union which had
been so vehclnently against granting
private enterprise any legal personality
under thc space treaties, would now be
fundalnentally unable to recover any
daillages under the Liability
Convention as a consequence of the
Soviet Unjon's Sllccess in tllis
j4
respect ... ~
Secondly, even if Iridiu111 would have
chosen to have its satellite launched,
for exanlple., froIII KOllrou by
Arianespace, clainls under the Liability
Convention should have been
addressed towards France and not the
United States., as an argumcllt that the
United States would be a launching
state merely on account of Iridium's
nationality, gi,ren the lack of clarity on
the illtemational level and tIle
interpretation of the United States as
elnanating from its national acts, meets
with considerable probably
insurmountable - problems.
4. TIle issue of 'fault'
The difficulties with applying tilC
Liability Convention discussed above
left asidc, it would be clear that any
liability issues under the Liability
COllvention would be a ll1atter for
Article III, as concerning "dalnage
being caused [by a space object]
elsewhere than on the surface of the
Earth to a[nother] space object". In
those cases liability w'ould be
apportioned according to fault.
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PriJl1a .facie, this seems to be a very
sensible and logical approach. Space
objects are operated consciously and
knowingly, and if one of theln leaves
nominal or or
othcnvise starts to behave and move
it to illto
another, the operator of the [ortner
would be held liable on the basis of
for the by the
lattcr., whereas the operator of the latter
would in the of fault not be
liable for an~y damage susta1tled by the
[oriller as a result of the collision"
"Fault' thus, presumably of its
seelningly obvious clarity, was not
defined any further yet, first
international satelllte collislon as per
IridiulTI 33 versus Cosmos 2251 raises
questions in this Prin1G
facie., to be sure, as varlOUS
COll1ll1entators already pointed
out, such an analysis \vould seem to
point at liability on the Russian side, as
it was with doubt the Cosmos
2251 that, having enjoyed a complete
of control from ground,
strayed [raIn its original nominal orbit
so as to cross the path of the fll1ly
functioning Iridium 33.
However: 'fault' has been defined as:
'"1" error or or
of conduct; any deviation fronl
prudcl1ce or duty resulting fronl
inattention, bad
faith, or Inismanagement. ( ... ) 2. The
intcn1iona1 or to
maintain sonle standard of conduct
when that failure results ill hann to
_...... ,"' ........._.. person. 'Fault liability' then
is ""liability based on SOl1le degree of
, alternatively "a
tYl1c of liability in which the plaintiff
must prove that the defendant's
was either or
intentional" and as such the opposite of
strict liabi lity2?
In other ,vords: a 'fault' preSllmes a
choice for the person at faldt, a choice
203
between at least two options of
"conduct", w11ere that person whether
by "intention' or 'negligence' has
chosen an option (that is by flawed
"jttdgmcnt") leadl11g to the hann
concerned'! where choosing another
option would not have led to
harnl.
Applying this gClleric definition of
'fault' to case at hand, however,
would lead to the cOllnter-intuitivc
conclusion that, if entity, Iridium
would be the liable one. As was
continned by Iridiunl spokesperson
Elizabeth Mailander, company
indeed could have moved the satellite
out of the way if a
warning. By contrast., ever sil1ce
(~oslnos 2251 had run out of control
SaIne years there was
nothing the Russians COllld have done
to 11lake 1 a collision
with Iridium
At the saIne tinle: could Russia really
hold the United or the
company conccmed29 liable for
'da111age' done to a lifeless piece
metal in outer space the logical
conclusion of the above reasoning?
While it might still serve SOlne
practical purposes and/or represent
SOlne real to the OWller~ in
absence of applicability of any concepts
suel1 as 'abandonlllent' and 'salvage' in
outer law generally speaking it is
still for the operator to make a
detennination of
In order to circum\'ent the abo've first-
lc\rcl conclusion as leading "'to a resll1t
which is manifestly absurd or
llnreasonable,,30 one \vould have to
nlove to a analysis.
preSul11ption of a Cll0icc of action on
both sides does not only preSUlne actual
capability to manoeuvre, but
knowledge of a need to do 80'\ in other
words: a sound' which to
make a "judgemcllt" in the sense of
Published in the Proceedings of the International Institute of Space Law (2009): 199-209.
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and would be able to replace the 33 on
short .L..L ....... ~ .... •
At the same time all parties hedged
their bets, for one good reason: with
the hundreds of of debris
(counting only the traceable ones) and
in view of their lifetime there is a
from-theoretical possibility for decades
into the future that third parties' space
objects be damaged. This would
bring i11to play Article IV of the
Liability Convention, which states
relevant part: "In the event of dalnage
being caused elsewhere than on the
surface Earth to a space
of one launching State or to persons or
property on board such a
by a space object of another launching
State, and of damage thereby being
caused to a third State or to its natural
or juridical persons, the first two States
shall be jointly and liable to
the third State, to tIle extent illdicated
by the following: ( ... ) (b) If the
dalnage been to a space
object of the third State or to persons
or property on board
elsewhere than on the surface of the
Ea11h, their liability to the third ..)late
shall on the oj'
the ./irst fvvo 5"ftates or on the .fault qf'
wholn either
responsible. Note, that if for
example - a French satellite would be
dalnaged by a piece debris of
Iridillm-Cosmos collision, it vvould not
Inatter the
actually be f'r01l1 the one or fron1 the
other; what matters is solely which of
the two was at fault the primary
collision.
Mutatis saIne would
apply in case of third-party dalnage on
earth, for which as SUCll absolute
liability would apply, but the issue
fault would deterrnine the distribution
"""'-JJ.J.J."........... J.J."'-H~f.... J......,'J.J. to third ...... n-r..- .. r'loC'
amongst Rllssia and the United
States. 34
Black's Law Dictionary's definitiol1 as
to appropriate course of __ "'.,....., ........
If the Russia11 authorities would have
had knowledge of at least a substantial
a collision, they might perhaps
not have been able to Inove Cosnlos
lout of the but \\lould
certainly have been able to infonn
Iridiunl that a mal10euvre might be
A failure to then do so
would ccrtaill1y establish a large
measure of fault on their as
can be glanced, however, the Russian
authorities ~o far have denied any
knowledg(~ potential for a
collision.
the of
(dis)proof shifts again to the US side.
Not only is the US space surveillance
network generally considered to be the
most advanced and sophisticated
according to a
article aerospace analyst T.S. Kelso
found that the Pentagoll's public data
showed that the two satellites would
have missed each other by a mere 584
Inetres whilst error ran
into several kilometres. Also lTIoving
to this second level of analysis,
still seell1S to lead to the
unsatisfactory result of making one
of perfectly
satellite in its nOlninal orbit liable for
dalnage caused to another satellite,
which had stopped having apparent
useful hlnction many years earlier and
left as a
conseqllencc long since.
One lnight of course argue that all this
at least for the tilne mere
theory, since both parties have desisted
any formal and are actually
looking for a de-escalation of any
threatening dispute. 32 Rllssia does not
wish to pursue a somewhat p~rverse
claim for dalnage to a useless piece of
junk, whilst has
announced it had a spare ready anyway
204
Published in the Proceedings of the International Institute of Space Law (2009): 199-209.
Copyright 2010, Frans von der Dunk. Used by permission.
In sum: the absence of a clear, or at
least \vorkable definition of 'fault' that
takes into C011sideration the specifics of
space activities and satellites, such as
the virtllal absence of possibilities of
OIl-site investigatiollS looking for the
'real" causes of the accident, ITIig}lt still
tum Ollt to present a major problem if
sonlcwhcre in the future debris
traceable to the Cosnl0s 225] -Iridiunl
33 collision causes damage to a third
state's satellite.
5. The issue of 'sQace debris'
A final important elel11ent in the
discussion on \vhom to blall1c prilllarily
for the collision, not discussed so far,
concerned the element of "deviation
from prudence or duty" or "failure to
Inail1tain some stalldard of COl1duct", in
the ternlS of Black's Law Dictiol1ary.
Sonlc comnlcntators have SOllght to
circumvent the countcr- intuitive result
of an application of the Liability
Convention to the letter by seeking the
fault of Russia in the lucre fact that it
had 'allo\vcd' its satellite to run out of
control ill the first place, thus creating a
piece of space debris and aln10st
'willingly' accepting the risk it nlight
later on cause SOlne damage. Indeed,
had Russia by doing so violated
applicable rules of international law,
the step to declaring it conseqllently
liable for the harmful consequences of
its acts ~rould have been relatively
sn1a11.
However, even apart frolll the lack of
clarity abollt \vhcthcr the disablc111cnt
of tI1e (~oslnos 2251 back in
(presumably) 1995 was a sudden and
unforeseen event or vvhether the
operators had seen it COining, back in
1995, let alone i11 1993 wIlen COSlll0S
2251 was launched., there was no such
thing as a "duty" or "standard of
COllduct" requiring Russia to, for
205
example, use the last bit of on-board
fuel to relegate tIle satellite to a
j-un.kyard orbit or to l1ave it de-orbited.
Article IX ~f the Outer Space Treaty~
the single relevant clause in this
context (al1d of course ill force for
Russia in 1993 al1d 1995) lTIerely
required states to "conduct ex.ploration
of them so as to avoid their harmful
contalllination"~ which is at best an
obligatioll of effort rather tl1a11 an
obligation of result, of t1J~ing in good
faith rather then being obliged to avoid
any harmful contan1ination.
Only ill recent years 11as tl1is
fundamental lack of legal limitations to
the 'freedom to create space debris'
started to be curbed - thanks, in first
instance, to the Inter-Agency Space
Debris (~oordination Committee
(lADe) and th.e guidelines it had
drafted by Scptenlbcr 2007.35 Though
still in voluntary' fashion, the
guidelines on debris mitigation
included strong recomnlendations to
move satellites nearing their elld of life
to junkyard orbits or to dc-orbit them;
guidelil1es which are novy being
implemented as licensing requirements
for private operators ill some states as
well as having been. lifted to a higher
level of visibility, political and
ultinlately also legal relevance by
nlcans of a UN Resolutiol1.36
Whilst such developnlents are
obviollsly to be applauded., they
equally Ob\T101ISly COnfirlTI that back in
1993 or 1995 nothit1g of the so]1
existed - in other \vords, only with
great difficulty could Russia be held to
ha\le fallen short of "deviation from
[applicable] prudence or dllty'~ or
"failure to maintain some [applicable]
standard of conduct".
Even no\v, there is no apl"licable clear-
cut and conlprehensive legal obligation
of the sort under illternational law.
Once such an obligation \vould become
established beyond doubt - whether by
Published in the Proceedings of the International Institute of Space Law (2009): 199-209.
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international treaty or as a matter of
undisputed customary' international law
the Liability COllvention could
considerably gain in effectiveness or
... ..l'- ........ 'Iloot_ .... applicability, since 'fault'
could be established by criteria that
make sellse in the particular context of
activities.
In sum: the collision also confirlTIS that
is value further
'juridifying't obligations to lTIinimise
both tlle of space debris and
its potentially hannful consequences~if
only to allow the Liability (~onvention
to work more in context
of fault.
international law-orie11ted liability
regil11e back on the table.
In Vie\\l of the absence so far of damage
caused to the 'real' third parties (that is
beyond United Iridiunl
Russia), the Ljability Convention has
not been invoked yet~ but whether it
would stand the test once it lrvou/cl be, is
still a matter of grave doubt. 'The cow
may 110t have left ban1, but it
sellses the opening and tilne may be
rU11nlllg out to close the barn door.
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